This research aims at providing a sound concept and pilot application of a security centre in a study area of Bucharest that suffered a demolition in the 1980s. As this is at present a protected area, there is a need for a multi-hazard threats assessment. The cultural value was assessed with scoring criteria and methods, on six scaling stages. The functional value, as well as the seismic vulnerability was evaluated, for building classes and urban plan provisions. The hazards and scenarios were for: earthquakes, floods, extreme climatic events, technological and terrorist explosions and dangerous chemical spilling. The affected area would be large and a considerable amount of property damage and affected persons would be recorded; thus, community readiness is a must. The security centre was set on special criteria to provide sheltering and living conditions for evacuated persons, being also a community disaster preparedness locus. The authors aimed at technical and institutional management tools to create an urban security zone within or closer to the community. Under a multihazard threat, the location and the extent of the security centre was located in the premises of a local college, for seismic or explosion hazard, and in a park or in a public place on a close hill, for flood hazard. Besides reliable buildings, tents and containers are also considered as potential sheltering spaces.
General considerations
The paper presents the Romanian Project URBASRISK [1] , as a multi-hazard risk reduction approach in an area of Bucharest that underwent demolition in the 1980s and which at present represents a protected area, falling under the incidence of specific heritage laws and regulations. One of the objectives of the project is to find the best location and functions of a security centre for evacuated inhabitants, in an attempt to change the practice of thinking emergency shelters. Thus, these should not be considered as just places of refuge, but they should instead provide, inside them or very close to the protected area, a space related to the affected community that would play a more important role in the recovery period.
This approach is directly related to the UN-ISDR requirement of resilience [2] , defined as follows: "The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions". The building of resilience to disasters in the context of sustainable development was reiterated in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 [3] .
The Rockefeller campaign "100 Resilient cities", launched in 2013 [4] , and the Bloomberg Competition on urban resilience [5] are examples of global practical approaches. For World Heritage properties, UNESCO, ICCROM and WHC developed a strategy for reducing risks from disasters; this is a useful tool also for other heritage categories, as shown by Boccardi [6] .
Some [7] , Georgescu et al. [8] , Gociman et al. [9, 10] . Until now, the concept of cultural value has been studied by the authors using scoring criteria and methods based on the six scaling stages of the Romanian Law of Monuments. The functional value was evaluated, as well as the seismic vulnerability, for the existing building classes, taking into account the provisions of the Urban Development Plan and the multi-hazard threats considered under specific scenarios.
The specific of multi-hazard scenarios in the protected area
The area is located in Bucharest in front of the Parliament, along Blvd. Unirii, towards Unirii Square, delimited by Regina Maria at South and Dambovita River at North, consisting of three subzones. The local geology is of a former meadow and marsh of Dambovita River, drained in the 19th Century; thus, the water table is rather high (Fig. 1) .
The multi-hazard impact scenarios considered a rather extensive list of potential natural and man-made threats. Some of them were assessed in Figure 1 : Map of protected areas -studied area [11] .
quantitative terms, while others were considered qualitatively, but in terms useful for a future security centre design.
The seismic hazard of Romania is dominated by the Vrancea zone, in southeast of the country, with intermediate depth earthquakes that affect with high intensities about 50% of the territory and very large areas in the neighbouring countries, in each strong event. Vrancea is different of usual crustal sources, as it proved a long-period spectral content, at least in South-East of Romania where thick Quaternary deposits exist.
The March 4, 1977 Vrancea earthquake in Romania provided a great scientific laboratory, based on unique and valuable lessons in seismological and engineering terms. Based on a survey on 18,000 buildings, it resulted that highrise pre-1940 reinforced concrete buildings are very vulnerable, while only a few types of the pre-1977 buildings are vulnerable. On the other hand, traditional and low-rise buildings have shown moderate vulnerability, in statistical terms.
The old, relatively low and stiff masonry buildings, present also in the protected area under study, have generally shown a better performance, especially in Bucharest. Nevertheless, they still may show important damage. Collapses were noticed in rather isolated cases, outside of Bucharest, as shown in Balan et al. [12] , Sandi et al. [13] . The impact of this earthquake in terms of damage and casualties proved that residential buildings are a source of long-term risk, as this was re-evaluated in Georgescu and Pomonis [14, 15] .
In this context, the main geological hazard scenarios considered were:  seismic hazard from intermediate Vrancea source, in two alternatives, e. g. intensity VIII, as in March 4, 1977 Balan et al. [12] , Sandi et al. [13] and VIII ½ (in order to take into account the cumulative vulnerability);
 local ground hazards, as liquefaction and/or settlements of foundations. The climatic and hydrologic hazards taken into account in the study were:  wind, snow-storm, urban vortex-tornado, high water-table, seasonal temperature variations (from -30ºC in winter to +40ºC in summer), rain, snow, frost;  floods caused by accidents outside the study area, as the alleged break of a water control and supply lake dike (at some kilometres away) under heavy rain, with lack of gates control. Man-made/technological hazards were:  explosions with chemical substances release, under Seveso Directive, in the city, reaching the protected area;  moderate spilling of ammonia (NH3);  explosions of gas pipelines or explosions in households of moderate size LPG recipients etc;  terrorist attack on public institutions, with impact upon the neighbouring communities. Hazard by urban fire arises from stoves in households and other buildings, with propagation of fire, in combination with other hazards.
Combined hazards -Na-tech -are successive events like earthquake, explosion, fire, floods etc.
For earthquake impacts, the study used specific vulnerability functions for earthquake impact from Bucharest buildings, calibrated and adjusted after [12, 13] , as well as simplified methods and expert opinions for other hazards, considering an average occupancy ratio per house. When relevant for exposure, hypotheses of day and night were used. The correspondence of intensity with instrumental data is taken from local data, as shown in [12] and [13] .
The vulnerability map is given in Fig. 2 . The vulnerability of inhabitants was related to two circumstances:  people inside buildings reaching damage degrees 3, 4 and 5, i.e. buildings that would need to be evacuated for safety; occupants become homeless and in need of shelter;  people inside of buildings reaching damage degrees 4 and 5, for which specific ratios of injuries, heavy injuries and death toll were considered. The vulnerability (state) value was determined as the average between the safety value and the environment value, as in Gociman et al. [9] .
Consequently, the earthquake scenario damage and casualties resulted as follows:  the number of buildings with significant damage for an intensity value I=VIII was around 63 and, for I=VIII½, of around 165, mostly low-rise buildings;  for the same intensity values, the number of heavy injured was 29 and 64 persons, live loss resulted of 59 and 92, respectively, and about 1809...3061 evacuated persons from such unsafe buildings were estimated, indicating a need of shelter;
 since the number of people from heavy damaged houses is only of about 355...677 and these dwellings have gardens and yards, some shelter can be arranged nearby;  the day-time scenario lead to exposure and casualties reduced by 50% in houses; however, an extra exposure of 10120 persons in the public institutions located in the neighbourhood was evaluated, as well as 1000 clients in commercial places, 1400 people in offices and 800 people in schools, while 400 people can be in churches. Since such buildings are less vulnerable, there are only 26 light injuries and 1 hospital entry;  the scenario for I = VIII½ gives a smaller number of heavy damaged buildings but indicates a need of investigation for safety assessment and possibly a great number of temporary or long-term evacuation for repairs and structural strengthening;  although this community is protected, in fact it is already weakened and heritage buildings need careful and long duration works. The scenario of climatic and hydrologic hazards is dominated by an extreme event of accidental flooding and only early warning can save the community persons, but not the built area. The water cover can be as high as 2.5 m and all two-storey houses as well as the first two stories of condominiums would be under water. Since the warning time is about one hour, this can be efficient during day-time but less during the night. Because this scenario is beyond the reaction capacity of the community, and its probability is reduced due to the permanent monitoring and the control of water flow by gates, it was not further evaluated.
In what concerns the terrorist scenario blasting, three hypotheses and corresponding impact radii were considered:  explosive in a quantity to be carried by one person in a backpack;  explosive in a quantity to be carried by a compact car;  explosive in a quantity to be carried by an urban van.
The damage or impact radii were evaluated after [16] , according to the following categories: D -radius of demolition impact; DI -irremediable demolition radius; DN -non-repairable radius; DM -minor destruction radius; DF -minimum protection radius against fragments/debris impact. A number of six scenarios were considered, with the three above-mentioned hypotheses for a particular location of an institution as the target of the attack, for two separate sub-zones. The results have shown that, as the explosive quantity increase, the impacts would affect very large and densely inhabited areas, with irreparable damage, fragmentation and debris spreading and great potential of injuries and casualties. An example is given in Fig. 3 .
However, the impacts are more or less localized, and this depends on the height of existing structures on the blast flow path, where some buildings provide a shielding effect. 
The concept of the community security centre
As a consequence of scenarios, the need and possibility to create appears for each hazard, shelter and security centre:  for seismic hazard scenarios, considering only the structural impact on buildings, a security centre could be created in the premises of "Mihai Eminescu" College;  for hydrologic hazard, as the flooding is supposed to cover all areas, the refuge and shelter area should be created in a higher place, near Academy House/Romanian Parliament, which are located in the vicinity;  for the terrorist scenario and/or other explosions, the impact is rather moderate, thus the location of the security centre in "Mihai Eminescu" College or in Izvor Park is recommended;  for extreme climatic hazards, as well as for the damage and dysfunction of urban infrastructures, the security centre in "Mihai Eminescu" College could play mainly the role of a daily food supply and social care centre, as well as of community information centre (Figs 4 and 5). The concept of the security centre is based on the following principles:  the centre of urban security, to be used as first emergency gathering place, under multi-hazards impact, shall be a safe site and building, endowed with survival resources storage and special infrastructure, as to be able to provide shelter and food for a large number of evacuated persons;  especially after earthquakes, there is a need of:
 immediate/temporary shelter for inhabitants rescued or evacuated from collapsed or heavy damaged buildings;  immediate/temporary shelter for inhabitants that were evacuated as a result of the emergency safety inspection;  preliminary health and hygiene checking/providing and triage/tagging for hospital treatment assistance;  keeping evidence of these persons.  this centre can be considered as a unit of local resilience within the whole urban system for disaster management;  in case of a larger view at urban scale, a multilevel system must include beside such security centre, the critical emergency services, as large hospitals, fire stations and centres of communications;  a poly-nuclear system of centres and evacuation places can be created after performing similar assessments in other communities, where the hazards, vulnerability and risks can be different;  if and when such a centre is designated or built as new, the safety requirements must be closer or according to the seismic code for first category of importance/occupancy;  when houses have gardens and yards, some shelter can be arranged nearby;  apart from especially designated buildings, tents and containers are considered as sheltering spaces, if and when season conditions allow.
Conclusions
The pilot-study and approach presented in the paper are in line with the UN-ISDR requirements, Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks [2, 3] and recent global initiatives for disaster resilience [4] [5] [6] . The multi-hazard impact scenarios for a Bucharest protected area have considered a rather extensive list of possible natural and man-made threats. Specific damage and impacts were evaluated and mapped, obtaining specific and sometimes contradictory patterns for earthquakes, flooding and terrorist attacks. As a consequence of scenarios, for each of the considered hazards the need and the possibility to create shelters and security centres was determined. These should be located inside or very near to the protected area, related to the affected community and playing an extended role in the recovery period. The present type of urban regulations and plans do not provide requirements for this interdisciplinary management of risks, since it relies mainly on "non edificandi" rules.
The prior selection of one or another place depends on the various institutions involved in disaster management.
The outcomes of this project could contribute to bridging the gap between stakeholders; among these, the community should play a significant role, with a transparent empowerment.
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